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INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the United States Supreme Court decided ML.B. v. S.L.J, its most
recent decision concerning termination of parental rights.2 The Court held that
where a state provides an appeal from ajudgment terminating parental rights,
it must, under the U.S. Constitution's due process and equal protection
*Associate Professor, University ofMaine School ofLaw; B.A., Yale College; J.D., Harvard
Law School. Thanks to Katharine K. Baker, Naomi IR Cahn, Scott Gould, Lois Lupica and Dean
Colleen Khoury for reading drafts; John McDuff and Rick Moore for providing background
information; Dennis Carrillo, TanyaFloerchinger, Karen Kimball andRebekah Smith forresearch
assistance; and Ruth Miner for administrative assistance. Thanks also to the Law and Society
Association for an opportunity to present an early version of this work at its 1998 Annual
Meeting, the New Words Salon for an opportunity to present an early version, and the University
of Maine School of Law for research funding. I want to particularly thank my colleague Lois
Lupica at University of Maine School of Law for her support and insights. Responsibility for any
errors, is of course, mine.
1. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
2. The M.L.B. v. S.L.J. decision was 6-3, with Justice Kennedy concurring. Id. at 128.
Justice Thomas and Justice Rehnquist filed separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 129. Justice Scalia
joined Justice Thomas' dissent; Justice Rehnquist joined in part in Justice Thomas' dissent. Id.
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mandates, provide indigent appellants with a transcript if a transcript is
necessary to review the decision.3 To reach this result, Justice Ginsburg, writing
forthe majority, hadto navigate unfavorable precedent holding that due process
did not require states to provide an appeal4 and that indigent parents did not
have an absolute right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases 5 ML.B.
strongly endorses parental rights against state authority, and on remand, the
Mississippi courts ultimately reversed the initial termination of the petitioner's
parental rights.6 Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent plurality decision in
Troxelv. Granville,' involving the constitutionality of Washington state's third
party visitation statute in the context of grandparent visitation, also endorsed
parental rights.' Troxel, however, involved very different circumstances, and
its ultimate significance is not clear because of the splintered nature of the
decision. 9

3. Id. at 107. States were not required to provide an appeal, but once they did, they could
not deny indigent defendants a transcript. Id.at 111, 128.
4. Id. at 110-11. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (holding
states are not constitutionally required to provide appellate review in civil cases).
5. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 117-18. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32
(1981) (stating parents have no absolute right to counsel in termination ofparental rights cases;
right depends on character and difficulty of case).
6. Following the Supreme Court's remand, M.L.B., armed with a transcript, was able to
successfully appeal the termination of parental rights decision. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *40 (Miss. Ct. App. May 18, 1999). This was
recently affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CT-00929-SCT,
2000 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. April 20, 2000). See infra notes 76-79, 96-115.
7. 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000) (plurality opinion).
8. Id. at 2057.
9. In Troxel, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court found that Washington's
broadly worded third party visitation statute, as applied in that case, was an unconstitutional
infringement of a parent's right to raise her children without state interference. Id. at 2063. The
Washington Supreme Court had held that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under federal
law because it was overbroad and did not require a showing of harm to a child before visitation
could be ordered. Id. at 2058-59. At the United States Supreme Court level, the plurality of four
justices, in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, found the lawwas unconstitutional as applied
to the dispute at hand. Id. at 2063. The dispute was between a mother and the parents of her
deceased boyfriend, over the extent of the grandparents' visitation with the children. Id. at 2057.
The trial court had ordered more visitation to the grandparents than the mother wanted to allow.
Id. at 2057-58. There had been no claim that the mother was unfit, the trial court had given no
weight to the mother's evaluation of the children's interest, and the mother was not seeking to cut
offvisitation entirely. Id. at 2061-63. As applied to these circumstances, where the trial court had
ordered a specific visitation schedule for the grandparents, the plurality held that the law
unconstitutionally infringed on the mother's parental rights. Id. at 2063. The concurrences of
Justices Souter and Thomas took contrasting positions, with Justice Souter saying that the
Washington Supreme Court should have affirmed the lower court's holding that the statute was
overbroad and facially unconstitutional because it interfered with parents' rights as set forth in
Supreme Court precedents. Id. at 2065-2067. Justice Thomas' concurrence argued that strict
scrutiny should have been applied to the statute since it interfered with fundamental rights and
also noted that the validity of the parental rights precedents had not been challenged, implying that
he might find those precedents incorrectly decided. Id. at 2067-68. Justice Scalia dissented,
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The purpose of this Essay is to examine and raise questions about certain
aspects of the Court's ML.B. decision which are distinct from the narrowly
doctrinal aspects of the decision.' The goal is not to assert that the decision is
"right" or "wrong," but rather to discuss family law issues related to the
decision in light of the Supreme Court's decision and subsequent decisions in
the case. The Court's decision and contemporary family law more generally
make certain core assumptions. These assumptions include the following: (1)
child custody decisionmaking" is fundamentally different from termination of
parental rights decisionmaking; (2) the advocacy system is the best forum for
deciding termination of parental rights disputes; (3) stepparent adoptions are

arguing that the matter should be left to the states. Id. at 2074-75. Justices Kennedy and Stevens
wrote separate dissents, both arguing that the lower court's decision should be reversed. Id. at
2075-79 (Kennedy), and 2068-74 (Stevens). As Troxel dealt with grandparent visitation rather
than termination of parental rights, it is not directly on point. Moreover, the narrow wording of
the plurality decision, discussing the statute only "as applied," and the divergent analysis of the
concurrences limits its significance in this context. However, both decisions pertain to parental
rights, and the language of the Troxel opinion is interesting in light of the M.L.B. decision so
Troxel will be discussed herein to the extent that it is pertinent.
10. The strictly constitutional aspects of the decision have been discussed elsewhere. See
generally Lloyd C. Anderson, The ConstitutionalRight of Poor People to Appeal Without
Payment ofFees: ConvergenceofDue ProcessandEqualProtectionin M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 32 U.
MICH.J. L. REFORM 441 (1999) (stating thatML.B expands the constitutional right of cost-free
appeal to a limited range of civil cases); Robert B. McDuff, M.L.B. V. S.L.J. and the Right of
Poor People to Go to Court, 18 Miss. C. L. REv. 5 (1997) (discussing ML.B. in the context of
constitutional law and indigents' access to court); Rick Moore, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.: Extension of
in fornapauperis Appeals to the CivilArena in Termination ofParentalRights Cases, 18 Miss.
C. L. R v. 19 (1997) (describing the majority opinion as an amalgamation of the Due Process
Clause and Equal Protection Clause); Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal
ProtectionJurisprudence:Recognizingthe Co-ConstitutiveNature ofRights and Classes,1999
U. ILL. L. REv. 1209 (finding that M.L.B. can be better understood by including an evaluation of
the interaction between rights and classes to typical equal protection jurisprudence); J.T. Price,
Recent Development,An ImproperExtension of CivilLitigationby Indigents: M.L.B.v.S.L.J.,
117 S. Ct. 555 (1996), 20 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 905 (1997) (giving a detailed summary of the
opinion); Jason T. Jacoby, Note, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.: "EqualJustice"for IndigentParents,32 U.
RICH. L. Rv. 571 (1998) (noting that the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause apply
in parental rights termination proceedings for indigents); Sundeep Kothari, Comment,AndJustice
for All: The Role Equal Protectionand Due Process Principles Have Played in Providing
Indigentswith Meaningful Access to the Courts, 72 TuL. L. Rv. 2159 (1998) (suggesting that
a combination of due process and equal protection principles have driven the expansion of
indigent rights).
11. "Child custody decisionmaking"refers to decisions concerning which legally recognized
parent shall live with the child and which legally recognized parent shall visit with the child. The
term does not refer to the means by which someone can be recognized as a legal parent. See, e.g.,
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (stating the probate court had equity jurisdiction
to grantvisitation between child and de facto parent), cert.denied 120 S.Ct. 500 (1999). Nor does
the term refer to decisions related to custody or visitation ofa child by grandparents or others who
are not legally recognized as parents. Similarly, "child custody disputes" refers to disputes
concerning which legally recognized parent shall live with the child and which legally recognized
parent shall visit with the child.
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essentially the same as non-stepparent adoptions; and (4) children's interests
are often overlooked in the applicable analytical framework. This Essay
challenges these assumptions. As close examination ofthe facts in ML.B will
show, these assumptions are ill-fitted to the facts of family situations in many
instances. In fact, an examination of the relationship between the ML.B.
decision and the aforementioned assumptions indicates the need for suggestions
with a different focus. For instance, providing legal assistance for indigent
parents in custody litigation, considering open adoption in stepparent adoptions,
and paying more attention to the legal status of children are ideas that may lead
to the development of more nuanced, child-centered ways of thinking about
parental rights.
Part II of this Essay highlights pertinent aspects of the M.L.B. decision and
analyzes the doctrinal aspects of the decision. Part III discusses and questions
key assumptions made in the ML.B. decision and in contemporary family law
and suggests other approaches that should be considered.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN ML.B. v. S.L.J. AND SUBSEQUENT
CASE HISTORY

AlthoughML.B. v. S.L.J.was atermination of parental rights case, it arose
in the aftermath of a divorce and in conjunction with a remarriage and
adoption.' 2 M.L.B. and S.L.J. were married for almost eight years before
divorcing in June 1992.'" They had one child born in April 1985 and one child
born in February 1987.'" Following the divorce, the children remained in their
father's custody, which was agreed upon at the time of the divorce. 5 In
September 1992, S.L.J., the children's father, remarried, and the children
continued to live with him.16 In November 1993, S.L.J. and his new wife J.P.J.
filed a petition to terminate M.L.B.'s parental rights 7 and to allow for J.P.J.'s
adoption of the children, who were six and eight years old at the time of the

12. M.L.B. v. S.L.L, 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996). This is a typical situation for a large
proportion of adoptions. See MARGAREr M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, 161-63
(1994).
13. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Under Mississippi law, an adoption petition can be filed by an unmarried person or
a married couple. MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (1994 & Supp. 2000). A parent can voluntarily
relinquish parental rights and consent to an adoption. MISS. CODEANN. § 93-15-103(2) (1994 &
Supp. 2000). The parental rights ofone parent can be terminated without terminating the parental
rights of the other parent. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-109 (1994 & Supp. 2000). If the parental
rights of a parent have been terminated, the parent shall not be heard in the adoption proceeding.
MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-7 (Supp. 2000).
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petition." Under the conventional system, the parental rights of the biological
parents must be terminated in order for an adoption to go forward. 9 The
petition alleged that M.L.B. had not exercised her visitation rights and still
owed child support.2" M.L.B. counterclaimed, alleging that S.L.J. had not
allowed her reasonable visitation in violation ofthe divorce decree and seeking
primary custody of the children.2' Prior to filing the counterclaim to the
termination petition, M.L.B. had not asked the court to enforce the divorce
decree to allow her visitation.'
After a hearing, which took place on three separate days between the
summer and fall of 1994, the Chancellor in December 1994 terminated
M.L.B.'s parental rights, ordered the adoption by J.P.J., and ordered that the
children's birth certificates show J.P.J. as their mother.' This is standard
Mississippi procedure for adoptions24 as well as the standard procedure in other
states.' Mississippi law provides that parental rights may be terminated "when
there is [a] substantial erosion of the relationship between the parent and child
which was caused at least in part by the parent's serious neglect, abuse,
prolonged and unreasonable absence, unreasonable failure to visit or
'
communicate, or prolonged imprisonment."26

18. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107 (1996). S.L.J. must consent to the adoption of the children by
J.P.J. and himself; the adoption could then take effect immediately, assuming M.L.B.'s parental
rights already had been terminated. The adoption decree may be entered immediately if a child is
the stepchild of a petitioner or is related by blood to the petitioner within the third degree or in
some other circumstances. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-13 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
19. An adoption cannot take place if any parent whose parental rights have not been
terminated objects. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-7 (Supp. 2000). For a discussion of adoption
proceedings requiring termination of parental rights see MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 163-64;
Margaret M. Mahoney, OpenAdoption in Context: The Wisdom andEnforceabilityof Visitation
OrdersforFormerParents Under Uniform AdoptionAct§ 4-113, 51 FLA. L. REV. 89, 92 (1999);
and Philip S. Welt, Adoption andthe Constitution: Are Adoptive ParentsReally "Strangers
Without Rights"? 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 165, 174-77. As Mahoney notes, adoption by a
stepparent generally takes place through the joint petition of the stepparent and the biological
parent to whom the stepparent is married. MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 161-63. Even though a
court technically may temporarily terminate the parental rights of the biological parent who is
married to the stepparent, the biological parent's rights are reestablished through the granting of
the petition. The adoption by the stepparent will not affect the legal or custodial relationship
between the child and the biological parent who is married to the stepparent. MAHONEY, supra
note 12, at 163-64.
20. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
21. Id.
22. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *6 (Miss.
Ct. App. May 18, 1999); see infra notes 96-101.
23. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107-08.
24. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-21 (1994) (detailing how to revise birth certificates).
25. See Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implicationsfor
CollaborativeAdoption Law and Practice,75 B,U.L.REv. 997, 1007 n.40 (1995) (referencing
methods of revising birth certificates in various states).
26. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 108 n.l (citing MISS. CODEANN. § 93-15-103(3) (1994)).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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In the Chancellor's written order terminating M.L.B.'s parental rights and
allowing the adoption, the Chancellor echoed the statutory language, stating
that there had been a "'substantial erosion of the relationship between the
natural mother... and the minor children' which had been caused 'at least in
part by [M.L.B.'s] serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence27
or unreasonable failure to visit or communicate with her minor children."'
The Chancellor further found that S.L.J. and J.P.J. had met their burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidences in accordance with the required
evidentiary standard.29 The Chancellor made a lengthy oral order from the

bench, but because M.L.B. could not afford the transcript, she was not able to
use the order in her initial appeal.30
M.L.B. appealed and paid the $100 filing fee, but was not able to pay the
$2352.36 transcript preparation fee. 31 Mississippi law provides that "if the
appellant 'intends to urge on appeal,' as M.L.B. did, 'that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence"' the
appellant must order and pay for the relevant parts of the transcript.12 The
guardian ad litem, who was appointed in accordance with Mississippi law to
protect the children's interests in this matter,33 did not appeal the Chancellor's
decision.34 The Mississippi Supreme Court denied M.L.B.'s application to

27. Id. at 107-08. Justice Ginsburg noted the brevity of the lower court's order that was
available to the Supreme Court: "Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence,
however, or otherwise reveals precisely why M.L.B. was decreed, forevermore, a stranger to her
children." Id. at 108; see infra note 30.
28. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 108.
29. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that decisions terminating
parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence).
30. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 108-09. The Mississippi Appeals Court decision following the
United States Supreme Court decision sets forth in full the Chancellor's fact-finding and decision.
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *5-28 (Miss. Ct. App.
May 18, 1999).
31. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 108-09.
32. Id.Mississippi law states a party can make a motion for findings of fact and conclusions
of law after a court has issued its decision, and if a party makes such a motion, the court must
issue findings and conclusions. Miss.R. Civ. P. 52. However, the court's findings and conclusions
need not be in writing. Conversation with John McDuff, Esq. (January 21, 2000). It is not clear
whether M.L.B. made such a motion after reviewing the Chancellor's brief decision. Efforts to
reach M.L.B.'s counsel were unsuccessful. Even if she had made such a motion, the court's
findings might have been oral, and thus a transcript would have been necessary to review them.
In any event, the Chancellor did issue a lengthy oral order. See supra note 30.
33. MISS. CODEANN. § 93-15-107(1) (Supp. 2000) (requiring appointment of a guardian
ad litem "to protect the interest of the child in the termination of parental rights" proceedings).
There is tremendous variation between states concerning representation of children in termination
ofparental rights proceedings and child protective proceedings generally. See JEAN KOH PETERS,
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS:

ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL

DIMENSIONS § 2-3(b), at 24-33, app. B, at 255-477 (1997).
34. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 95-853, 1996 WL 587663, at *23, *29 (1996) (transcript of oral
argument before the United States Supreme Court).
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proceed informapauperis,and, thus, M.L.B. could not pursue her appeal as the
state would not pay for the transcript.35
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether "a State, consistent with
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
[may] condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on
the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees."36 In resolving this
Ginsburg analyzed the nature of the decrees terminating parental
issue, Justice
37
rights.
In analyzing the issue of whether the state had to pay for M.L.B's
transcript, Justice Ginsburg highlighted the "narrow category of civil cases in
which the State must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to
a party's ability to pay court fees."38 She noted that cases "involving state
controls or intrusions on family relationships" are treated differently from other
civil cases.39 In such contexts, "to guard against undue official intrusion, the

Court has examined closely and contextually the importance of the
governmental interest advanced in defense of the intrusion.' ' OJustice Ginsburg
thus referred to the equation as "government interest" versus "family
relationship."
Justice Ginsburg also cited two criminal cases as precedent. Griffin v.
Illinois4 ' and Mayer v. Chicago42 require that a state providing an appeal from
criminal convictions, including misdemeanor convictions, cannot bar indigents
from the appeal process.43 Justice Ginsburg, characterizing Mayer, stated that
"[a]n impecunious party... whether found guilty of a felony or conduct only

35. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 109. The Mississippi Supreme Court's decision denying her
application to proceed informa pauperis was unreported. Petitioner's Brief at * 1, M.L.B. v.

S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853), available at 1996 WL 291022. At least thirty-one
states provided transcripts for parental rights termination appeals. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 122 n.13.
According to the petitioner, only Mississippi took the position that informapauperisappeals
were not allowed in civil cases. Petitioner's Brief at *26-27, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102
(1996) (No. 95-853), availableat 1996 WL 291022.
36. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
37. Id.at 113-19. These are civil cases and do notinvolve the threatof incarceration oreven
a fine. Id.
38. Id. at 113. Filing fees in civil cases generally do not raise due process implications. Id.
at 114-16.
39. Id. at 116; see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that it
was a due process violation for the state to deny a divorce to a married couple based on their
inability to pay court costs because of their fundamental interest at stake in the marriage and the
"state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship").
40. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted).
41. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (overturning an Illinois rule that required all indigent defendants
except those sentenced to death to pay for a transcript in order to appeal their convictions).
42. 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (extending the Griffin rule to misdemeanor defendants).
43. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110-12.
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'quasi criminal in nature' 'cannot be denied a record of sufficient completeness
to permit proper [appellate] consideration of his claims."'44
Expanding on the constitutional protections for families, she restated the
principle that "[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of
children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic
importance in our society,' rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment
against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect."45 She
cited familiar precedents regarding marriage,46 procreation,47 and raising
children.48 She characterized M.L.B.'s case as "involving the State's authority
' and stated that the Court
to sever permanently a parent-child bond"49
approached the case "mindful of the gravity of the sanction imposed on
[M.L.B.] and in light of two prior decisions most immediately in point," 50
referencing the due process precedents of Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services5 and Santosky v. Kramer.2
In a footnote, Justice Ginsburg remarked that though "the termination
proceeding... was initiated by private parties as a prelude to an adoption
petition, rather than by a state agency, the challenged state action remains
essentially the same: M.L.B. resists the imposition of an official decree
extinguishing, as no power other than the State can, her parent-child
relationships."53 To Ginsburg, the dilemma is simply governmental interest
versus family relationship, despite the private origins of the issue in a
breakdown of a marriage.
Justice Ginsburg then highlighted aspects of Lassiterand Santosky which
emphasize the importance of the parents' interests over the state's interest.
Although Lassiterheld that indigent parents did not have an automatic right to
counsel in cases involving termination of parental rights,54 it emphasized the
importance of parents' interests in companionship with and custody of their
children." A decision terminating parental rights "'work[s] a unique kind of
deprivation.' For that reason, '[a] parent's interest in the accuracy and justice
of the decision ... is ...a commanding one."' 56 The Court in Santosky
44. Id. at 112 (citing Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196, 198).
45. Id.at 116 (citation omitted).
46. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
47. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
48. Id. (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)).
49. M.L.B., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 117.
51. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
52. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
53. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 n.8.
54. Id at 117 (citing Lassiter,452 U.S. at 31-32).
55. Id.at 117-18 (citing Lassiter,452 U.S. at 27).
56. Id.at 118 (quoting Lassiter,452 U.S. at 27).
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characterized
the parents' interests as "far more precious than any property
57
right."
Having laid the foundation, Justice Ginsburg turned to the issue of how to
classify M.L.B.'s situation. The situation could either be categorized as a
general civil case, in which the indigent would have no right to proceed without
fees, or it could be in the free-transcript category ofMayer v. City ofChicago8
because the "accusatory state action [M.L.B.] is trying to fend off is barely
distinguishable from criminal condemnation in view of the magnitude and

57. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982). Santosky articulated general
agreement (even from the dissenters) that "the interest of parents in their relationship with their
children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 774 (Relnquist, J., dissenting), quotedin M.L.B., 519 U.S.
at 119. In M.L.B. Justice Ginsburg also referred to a distinction between "the State's termination
of a fully existing parent-child relationship" and "the State's imposition of the legal obligations
attending a biological relationship between parent and child." ML.B., 519 U.S. at 118 n.11. A
later case held that paternity cases could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 575 (1987). For discussion of the issues of paternity and
developing parent-child relationships, see generally Millerv. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,424 (1998)
(upholding statutory distinctions in citizenship requirements for children born out of wedlock in
foreign lands which treat children of an alien father and citizen mother different from those of an
alien mother and citizen father); Lehr v. Robertson,463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) (holding a state
may accord different rights to parents if "one parent has an established custodial relationship with
the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship" with the
child (footnote omitted)); Caban v. Mohammed,441 U.S. 380, 382, 394 (1979) (holding a New
York adoption law unconstitutional as it distinguished between the rights of unwed mothers and
unwed fathers by providing for the adoption of an illegitimate child solely by the consent of the
mother); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of
Georgia adoption laws denying an unwed father the power to prevent the adoption of his child and
the state's recognition of the "difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare ofthe child"
of an unwed father compared to a married father); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658
(1972) (holding "parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their
children are removed from their custody"). For consideration ofproblems with the child protective
system, see generally Annette R. Appell, ProtectingChildrenor PunishingMothers: Gender,
Race, andClass in the ChildProtectionSystem: An Essay, 48 S.C. L. REv. 577 (1997) (arguing
children's needs are often not met by the various child protective systems); and Amy Sinden,
"Why Won't Mom Cooperate?"A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11
YALEJ. L. &FEMINISM 339 (1999) (highlighting various problems in child welfare proceedings).

58. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
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permanence ofthe loss she faces." 59 Justice Ginsburg placed M.L.B.'s situation
in the latter category.6
In discussing the doctrinal foundations of Griffin v. Illinois,6 Mayer v. City
of Chicago,62 and related cases, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that both due
process and equal protection concerns were present and that in the Griffin line
ofcases, "' [d]ue process and equal protection principles converge."' 63M.L.B.'s

59. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 119 (citation and footnote omitted). Justice Ginsburg's language in
that sentence and throughout the opinion is laden with emotion; Justice Ginsburg then asks how
much process is due before the state forever "brand[s] [her] unfit for affiliation with her children."
Id. at 119. "Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence, however, or otherwise
reveals precisely why M.L.B. was decreed, forevermore, a stranger to her children." Id. at 108.
Justice Ginsburg refers to the lower court's decision as a "stern judgment." Id. at 122. M.L.B. is
"endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction ofher family bonds, and to resist the brand
associated with a parental unfitness adjudication." Id. at 125. As the majority opinion's
emotionally laden language may imply a particularly strong, gender-based bond between mothers
and their children, it is interesting to consider whether the decision would have come out
differently had M.L.B. been a man trying to stop the adoption of his children by his ex-wife's new
husband, rather than a woman trying to stop the adoption ofher children by her ex-husband's new
wife. On the other hand, the rights of fathers to parent children born to their wives are deeply
embedded in traditional family law. See generallyMichael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130
(1989) (plurality opinion) (noting a husband has liberty interest in raising child born to his wife,
although child is probably not biologically related to husband). Therefore, as the children were
born "in wedlock," a hypothetical male would have the force of this tradition behind him. Even
more interesting is whether the decision would have come out differently had M.L.B. been a man
who had never married the mother of the children and who was trying to stop their adoption by
his ex-girlfriend's newhusband. The Supreme Court's precedents in this area have "protected the
rights of unwed fathers when they have lived with or established a substantial relationship with
their children, unless the unwed father is asserting rights against an 'intact' family." Naomi R.
Cahn,Models ofFamily Privacy,67 GEo.WAsH.L.REv. 1225, 1237 (1999) (footnote omitted).
See generally, Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children" and Their ParentsBefore the United
States Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H: Unlikely Participantsin Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. Rv. 1 (1999) (explaining that unwed fathers do have a liberty
interest in parent-child relationships). For an unwed father who had treated his visitation the way
M.L.B. may have, see text accompanying notes 105-13, it is possible that the Court would not
have been so sensitive to the meaning and consequences of terminating his parental rights. This
possibility is supported by the fact that a plurality of the Court recently upheld an additional
proof-of-paternity requirement for citizenship when the citizen parent of a child who is born outof-wedlock and abroad is the child's father, as opposed to the child's mother, against an equal
protection challenge. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998).
60. The Court indicated that it was "[g]uided by Lassiterand Santosky, and other decisions
acknowledging the primacy of the parent-child relationship... ." M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120. The
additional cases "acknowledging the primacy of the parent-child relationship" were Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) and Meyer v. Nebraska,262 U.S. 390,399 (1923). M.L.B., 519
U.S. at 120.
61. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
62. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
63. M.L.B., 519U.S. at 120 (quotingBearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,665 (1983)). Justice
Ginsburg noted, "The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out would-be
appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs. The due process concern homes in on
the essential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings anterior to adverse state action." Id.
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claim "heavily" rested on an equal protection framework "for... due process
does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal.""M
Without explicitly stating that there is no due process basis for the decision,
Justice Ginsburg stated, "We place this case within the framework established
by our past decisions in this area. In line with those decisions, we inspect the
character and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and
the State's justification for its exaction, on the other., 65 Again, the parent's
individual interest is paired against the State's exaction.
M.L.B.'s individual interests were significant.' She faced "forced
dissolution of her parental rights."'67 The loss of parental rights would be
permanent: "In contrast to loss of custody, which does not sever the parentchild bond, parental status termination is 'irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]' of the
most fundamental family relationship. ' 68 Further, "the risk of error ...

is

69
'

considerable."
Turning from M.L.B.'s interest, the majority considered the state's
"justification for its exaction." 7 The only interest of the state that was
considered was its financial interest in "offsetting the costs of its court
system."'" Justice Ginsburg found that "in the tightly circumscribed category
of parental status termination cases, appeals are few, and not likely to impose
an undue burden on the State."'72 Although state civil fees, such as filing fees,
generally are examined only for rationality, there are two exceptions: fees
involving the right to participate in political processes, and fees limiting access
to judicial processes in cases "criminal or 'quasi criminal in nature."' 73 Justice
Ginsburg placed termination of parental rights decrees in the quasi criminal

(citations omitted). She furthernoted, "A 'precise rationale' has not been composed because cases
of this order 'cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis."' Id. (citations
omitted).
64. Id.(citation omitted).
65. Id. at 120-21 (citation omitted).
66. M.L.B.'s interests were as strong as those of the "'impecunious medical student"' in
Mayer. Id.at 121 (quoting Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197). Justice Ginsburg noted that in Mayer the
student did not face jail, but "the conviction ... could affect his professional prospects and,
possibly, even bar him from the practice ofmedicine." Id. (citing Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197). Justice
Ginsburg further noted in Mayer that the state's "pocketbook interest in advance payment for a
transcript... was unimpressive when measured against the stakes for the defendant." Id. (citing
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197).
67. Id.
68. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753).
69. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 121. Justice Ginsburg noted that "of the eight reported appellate
challenges to Mississippi trial court termination orders from 1980 through May 1996, three were
reversed by the Mississippi Supreme Court for failure to meet the 'clear and convincing' proof
standard." Id. at 109 n.3.
70. See id. at 122-24.
71. Id. at 122.
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 124 (quoting Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971)).
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category, namelyfthe category where the State cannot "'bolt the door to equal
justice."' 7 4 Even though the fee requirement may have been rational, the
financial justification was unimpressive when measured against the rights at
stake for M.L.B.7"
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision, the Mississippi
Supreme Court reinstated M.L.B.'s appeal, required that she be allowed to
proceed without fees, and ordered that the record in the case be transcribed.76
Based on a detailed review of the Chancellor's trial level decision, the
Mississippi Court ofAppeals on remand held that M.L.B.'s parental rights had
been improperly terminated.77 According to that court, under Mississippi law
S.L.J. must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that M.L.B. actually
had abandoned her children, and as the evidence did not prove abandonment,
her parental rights should not have been terminated.78 This conclusion was
upheld by the Mississippi Supreme Court in April 2000."9 Thus, almost six
years after M.L.B.'s parental rights had been terminated, her rights were
reinstated so that she could have visitation with her children.
III. DISCUSSION
Four aspects of the Supreme Court's decision are particularly significant.
One is the distinction the court makes between judicial decisions concerning
termination of parental rights andjudicial decisions concerning child custody.8"
Second is the framework applied to the situation, which assumes that the
concept of a "risk of error" is meaningful and that adversarial decisionmaking

74. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1955)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
75. In his dissent, Justice Thomas warned that the decision would result in "greater demands
on the States to provide free assistance to would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases
involving interests that cannot, based on the test established by the majority, be distinguished from
the admittedly important interest at issue here." Id. at 130. Justice Thomas pointed out that it was
not clear whether the decision rested only on equal protection or had due process aspects, and he
asserted that if neither clause provided the basis for the free transcript, a combination of the two
clauses did not either. Id. He characterized the decision as dealing with "the new-found
constitutional right to free transcripts in civil appeals." Id.at 129.
76. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *3 (Miss.
CL App. May 18, 1999).
77. Id. at *40.
78. See id. at *40. Although the Chancellor had found that there had been "substantial
erosion" in the relationship, which was one of the requirements for terminating parental rights,
he did not also conclude that her actions constituted "abandonment," as required by Mississippi
law; moreover, the facts that the Chancellor found did not constitute "abandonment." Id. at *29,
40. See infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
79. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CT-00929-SCT, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 93, at * 1-2 (April 20,
2000).
80. See M.L.B.v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,127-28 (1996); infraPartll.A.See generallysupra
note 11 (defining "child custody decisionmaking").
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is the best way to reach accurate and fair results.8' Third is the lack of
distinction between stepparent adoptions and other adoptions.8 2 Fourth is the
exclusion of the interests of children from the framework. 3 Each will be
discussed below.
A. The DistinctionBetween Decisions Concerning Child Custody and
Termination of ParentalRights: For Indigent Parents, Often the
Difference Between the Two is Not Very Great
The majority opinion inM.L.B. sharply distinguishes between adjudication
of child custody disputes between parents and termination of parental rights
adjudication." The state's role in these two situations, by implication, is also
significantly different. Justice Ginsburg noted that "[iln contrast to loss of
custody, which does not sever the parent-child bond, parental status termination
is 'irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]' ofthe most fundamental family relationship."85
Family law enumerates various differences as well. Decisions terminating
parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence,86 while
parents' disputes over child custody, like other civil cases, are decided based
on a preponderance of the evidence. 7 There is no right to counsel for parents
in custody cases, yet there is a right to counsel for parents in many termination
of parental rights cases.88 Child custody orders are modifiable,89 while orders
for the termination of parental rights are not.' However, as explained below,
the two situations are not necessarily different with respect to the impact of
custody orders on indigent parents.
Justice Ginsburg noted that unlike termination orders, custody orders are
"matters modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed circumstances,".9'
and indeed, custody orders can be modified in those instances. 2 However, this

81. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120-21; infra Part III.B.
82. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 n.8; infra Part III.C.
83. See infra Part III.D.
84. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 121, 127-28.
85. Id. at 121 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (alteration in
original)).
86. Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,747-48 (1982) (decisions terminating parental rights
must be based on clear and convincing evidence).
87. See, e.g., Lipsey v. Lipsey, 755 So. 2d 564, 565 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the
moving party in an action to modify custody must prove its case by a preponderance of the
evidence).
88. Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18,31-32 (1981) (deciding the right to counsel
in termination of parental rights cases depends on character and complexity of case).
89. See 2 HoMERH. CLARK, JR., THELAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS INTHEUNITED STATES
§ 20.9, at 547 (Practitioner's ed., 2d. ed. 1987).
90. See id. § 21.2, at 572.
91. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996).
92. CLARK, supra note 89, § 20.9, at 547.
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distinction may not be as great as it seems. In fact, if one parent loses custody
to the other parent in a child custody dispute, it is unlikely that the custody
order will ever be modified "at the parties' will," since the winner will be
unlikely to agree to modify it. Further, a court's ability to modify custody
decisions is more theoretical than real, particularly when people cannot afford
counsel.93 Moreover, when people cannot afford counsel, enforcement of
custody decisions through contempt or other means is often impossible.94 By
the time a termination ofparental rights proceeding is brought and the indigent
parent obtains court-appointed counsel in the termination proceeding,95 the
relationship between the parent and child may already be damaged or
destroyed.
Scrutiny of the facts of M.L.B. raises questions along these lines.
According to the Supreme Court's opinion, the father's custody of the children
was decided by agreement between the parties upon divorce.96 The children
93. People of low and moderate income levels have difficulty obtaining attorneys for civil
matters. See generallyRoY W. REESE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, REPORT ON THE LEGAL NEEDS
AMONGLOW-INCOMEANDMODERATE-INCOMEHOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARYOFFINDINGS FROMTHE

COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1994), reprintedin FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
LEGALNEEDS STUDY 41- 44 (AMERICANBARAssOCIATION 1994) (finding low-income families
are less likely to seek counsel than moderate-income families and noting "a feeling that nothing
could be done" was "most frequently cited in low-income situations"). Attorneys generally refuse
to represent parties in a divorce without a substantial upfront retainer. CLARK, supra note 89,
§ 17.2, at 234. This retainer requirement of course would be applied to persons seeking
modifications of divorce decrees. Although domestic relations statutes often provide for feeshifting based on the financial capabilities of the litigants, CLARK, supra note 89, § 17.2, at 233,
fee-shifting is unwieldy in practice and often does not ensure that the poorer spouse (usually the
woman) receives competent representation. See Linda J. Ravdin & Kelly J. Capps, Alternative
Pricing of Legal Services in a Domestic Relations Practice: Choices and Ethical
Considerations,33 FAM. L.Q. 387,409 (1999); see also Melody Kay Fuller, UnbundlingFamily
Law PracticeCreates Pro Bono Opportunities,COLO. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 29, 30 (noting a
shortage of pro bono attorneys to represent parties in family law cases); Jeannette F. Swent,
GenderBias at the HeartofJustice: An EmpiricalStudy of State Task Forces,6 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 58-59 (1996) (summarizing findings of gender bias studies that women
have particular difficulty finding attorneys in divorce because oflackof funds); Rosalie R. Young,
The SearchforCounsel: PerceptionofApplicantsforSubsidizedLegalAssistance,36 BRANDEIS
J. FAM. L. 551, 557-60, 572-74 (1998) (describing experiences of indigent people who cannot
obtain attorneys and describing the particular need of women for counsel in divorce and other
family cases).
94. See sources cited supranote 93.
95. Despite the court's limited requirement for counsel in termination of parental rights
proceedings in Lassiter v. DepartmentofSocial Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), state legislatures
have "continued to expand the statutory right to counsel" in such proceedings. Rosalie R. Young,
The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of ParentalRights Proceedings: The States'
Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REv. 247, 273-274 (1997).
96. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107. There is no information in the Court's opinion about why the
father had custody upon divorce or details ofthe circumstances ofthe agreement. The subsequent
Mississippi Court of Appeals' decision reveals that the divorce decree forbade M.L.B. from
exercising her visitation in the presence of J.B., who was her husband at the time of the
Chancellor's decision. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299,
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lived with their father for almost a year and a half before the petition to
terminate was filed.' The petition claimed that M.L.B. had not maintained
reasonable visitation." However, once the petition was filed and M.L.B.
obtained a court-appointed lawyer in the termination case, she counterclaimed
for full custody and alleged that the father had not provided her with reasonable
visitation as provided in the divorce decree. 9
But prior to her counterclaim to the termination petition, M.L.B. had not
taken steps to modify or enforce the judgment that she, in theory, could have
obtained under Mississippi law. For example, she could have filed a motion to
change the terms of the divorce judgment so that she would get more or
different visitation rights." ° Alternatively, she could have filed a motion for
contempt or enforcement of the judgment alleging that she was being denied
visitation.'"'
There is no way of knowing from any of the opinions exactly why M.L.B.
did not take advantage of any of these options during the year and a half
between the divorce judgment and the filing of the termination petition.
However, some clues may be gleaned from the Chancellor's opinion. First,
M.L.B., who had an eleventh grade education, worked various jobs during this
period.'" After an eight year marriage, she received only an automobile and
two quilts from the divorce.' 3 It is reasonable to infer that her jobs during this
period did not pay high wages and that she did not have funds to hire a lawyer
to try to enforce or modify the custody order during this period.' °4 Second,
M.L.B. and her new husband had significant problems which may have
interfered with her efforts to visit or to enforce the visitation provisions of the
divorce decree. The parties were divorced in June 1992, and M.L.B. married
J.B., her boyfriend prior to the divorce,'0" in October 1 9 9 2 ."°6 At some

at *6. See infra notes 104-09.
97. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Miss. CoDE ANN. § 93-5-23 (1994 &Supp. 2000) (allowing the court on petition,
after issuing a custody decision, to change the decree and make such new decrees as the case may
require).
101. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-87 (1991) (giving the chancery court power to punish
violations of its orders through contempt proceedings). Contempt proceedings have been used to

enforce visitation orders. See, e.g., Saunders v. Saunders, 724 So. 2d 1132, 1135-36 (Miss. Ct.
App. 1998) (upholding lower court's determination that ex-wife was in contempt of court's order
on visitation).
102. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at * 16, 20
(Miss. Ct. App. May 18,1999). Herplaces ofemployment includedTimberCraft, Wilbank's BarB-Que, Rest Haven and Ripley Manor. Id.at *17. She is now a certified nurse assistant. Id.
103. Id.
104. See CLARK, supra note 89, § 17.2, at 233-34.
105. M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *7.
106. Id. at *6, 20. S.L.J. remarried in September 1992. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
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unspecified time, J.B. was convicted of an assault on a police officer and had
spenttime injail.' 7 Afterhe physically and emotionally abused M.L.B., she left
him for about a year.'0 8 Thus, during the year and a half between the divorce
(June 1992) and when the petition was filed (November 1993), she married a
man who abused her and then left him.'" When the petition was filed, she was
apparently separated from him.
There are factual disputes concerning M.L.B.'s visitation and attempts at
visitation during this period. M.L.B. claimed that S.L.J. hung up the phone on
her when she tried to speak with her children."' S.L.J. claimed that M.L.B. did
not frequently visit"'-at times he did not know where she was"---and that
she hung up the phone when he called."' It is possible that M.L.B. could have
had more visitation during this period, but it is impossible to know whether
M.L.B. would have taken the necessary steps to enforce or change the divorce
judgment had she had ready access to an attorney. There is no way to know for
certain whether the counterclaim in the parental rights case seeking full custody
was made in order to try to strengthen her strategic position," 4 or for some
other reason."'

107. M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *17.
108. Id. at *20. M.L.B. left J.B. between roughly June 1993 and July 1994. Id.
109. The petition was filed in November 1993. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
110. M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at * 19. According to the Chancellor, M.L.B.
testified that the last time she had the children with her was October 15, 1993, which was over
a year before the final hearing prior to the termination. Id. at * 17-18. M.L.B. visited the children
at her sister's house in the fall of 1994 and on other occasions when the children were staying at
her sister's house. Id. at * 16-18. M.L.B.'s sister testified that M.L.B. tried to see her children,
bought gifts for them, and that sometimes the children called M.L.B. Id.at * 16. M.L.B. testified
that S.L.J. would not allow her to deliver gifts for the children. Id. at * 17. M.L.B. testified that
S.L.J. "would not allow her visitation," and so she stopped paying child support. Id. at * 19. S.L.J.
testified that the last time he believed M.L.B. saw the children was in early August 1994, at their
aunt's house. Id.at * 9. S.L.J. testified he dropped the children offwith their aunt (M.L.B.'s sister)
so they could visit with their mother, but that M.L.B. had come by only one time and stayed for
about thirty minutes. Id. at *10. S.L.J. also stated that at one point after the divorce he left the
children for a week with M.L.B.'s sister so that M.L.B. could visit with them but that M.L.B.
"only visited about twice during that week." Id. at *11, 21. This testimony of S.L.J. is not clearly
rebutted in the Chancellor's summary of M.L.B.'s or her sister's testimony. Id. at *22-28. It is
difficult to tell from the Chancellor's opinion how much visitation was attempted and how much
visitation actually took place. Id.
111. Id. at*5.
112. Id. at*8.
113. Id. at*19.
114. A possible strategic reason for the counterclaim is the possibility that a judge would
be less likely to terminate her parental rights if she claimed she actually wanted full custody and
not just visitation.
115. After the counterclaim was filed, M.L.B.'s position changed. At the Chancellor's
hearing, M.L.B. testified that she was only seeking visitation, not custody. M.L.B., 1999 Miss.
App. LEXIS 299, at *20-21. See infra note 158.
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In a practical sense, for the indigent parent losing custody, ajudgment of
custody for the other parent is not always very different from a judgment
terminating parental rights. While the court orders are theoretically modifiable,
without the assistance of counsel they may in practice be almost final
adjudications of parental rights. Similarly, while orders are theoretically
enforceable by contempt or other means, retaining counsel to handle such a
fact-intensive, time-consuming matter is likely to be extremely difficult if a
litigant lacks substantial funds." 6 When a termination petition eventually is
filed and counsel is appointed by the court for an indigent parent, the
relationship between that parent and the child may already be thoroughly
undermined. Thus, the state's role in the two contexts may be viewed as more
similar than different.
The state's role in deciding custody disputes between parents is certainly
not minor or incidental. As in termination of parental rights cases, it is
tremendously consequential. If the fundamental reason for the free transcript
requirement ofM.L.B. is that the challenged state action deeply affects parental
rights, logically there should be similar requirements in custody cases and other
family law cases." 7 In his dissent, Justice Thomas makes the same point with
alarm." ' Although the extension of M.L.B. and Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services".9 to child custody cases involving indigent parents is unlikely,
nonetheless, as noted above, strong arguments exist for such an extension.'2

116. See supra note 93.
117. The same argument applies to the court's counsel requirement of Lassiter v.
Department of SocialServices, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Custody issues cannot be clearly separated
from visitation issues, as the flip side ofa custody order often is the section pertaining to visitation
for the non-custodial parent. The plurality and concurrences in Troxel v. Granville show that
certain visitation orders can be unconstitutional, although the decision does not specify the exact
circumstances where such orders will be unconstitutional. See supranote 9. See also Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984) (holding that a custody decision based in part on race was
an unconstitutional denial of equal protection). Since the Troxelplurality's decision was narrow
and the concurrences were splintered, the exact significance of the holding is debatable. But
Troxel certainly does not say the custody or visitation orders are constitutionally equivalent to
termination of parental rights orders.
118. In his dissent, Justice Thomas claims the principles underlying the majority's decision
do not necessarily limit it to the context of termination ofparental rights, but could be extended
to other contexts such as transcripts for custody appeals. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 142
(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
120. Some policy arguments would call for a retention ofthe current system. One argument
is that broadened access to lawyers may breed more destructive litigation. However, under the
current system, the party with the most funds has the most access to lawyers and thus the greater
opportunity to engage in destructive litigation, which is highly problematic. Some also may argue
that in a world of finite resources and massive child poverty, using public resources to enable
parents to engage in custody battles at the government's expense is not a wise use of these
resources. However, one could respond that the current situation is untenable and that resources
are not so scarce.
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B. Risk of Errorandthe Advocacy System
This section will discuss and question two assumptions found in the
Supreme Court's decision in ML.B. and in its other termination of parental
rights decisions. 2' First is the idea that "risk of error"'" is a meaningful
concept in the context of parental rights terminations. Second is the idea that
the advocacy system, the "equal contest of opposed interests,"" m is the best way
to resolve disputes in this arena.
The termination of parental rights in M.L.B. and other opinions" is
governed by the due process framework established in Mathews v. Eldridge."5
A balancing test is used to evaluate whether the state's process for terminating
individual interests is sufficient to support the Court's decision. 6 The Court
must balance the individual's interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that
interest, and the state's interest. 2 Justice Ginsburg notes in ML.B. the "risk of
error... is considerable" in the context of termination of parental rights."' This
statement assumes that there is a correct outcome and an incorrect outcome in
parental rights termination cases and that the appeal process determines
whether the trial outcome was correct.
The idea of risk of error in parental rights termination cases ties in with
basic ideas about our adversary system, as articulated inLassiterv. Department
of Social Services.'29 The Lassiter Court stated "[O]ur adversary system
presupposes [that] accurate and just results are most likely to be obtained
through the equal contest of opposed interests."' 3 ° This statement presupposes
that accurate results can be reached in all areas of the law, including
termination of parental rights as in the context of Lassiter. It further

121. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18.
122. "Risk of error" is a phrase used by Justice Ginsburg in the M.L.B. decision. M.L.B.,
519 U.S. at 121.
123. "Equal contest of opposed interests" is a phrase used by Justice Stewart in Lassiter.
See Lassiter,452 U.S. at 28.
124. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18

(examining the right of indigents to receive appointment of counsel in termination proceedings).
125. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (identifying three factors to be considered in determining
whether administrative procedures are constitutionally sufficient: the private interest affected by

the offical action, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest, and the government's
interest); see Santosky,455 U.S. at 754-70 (applying the Mathews framework); Lassiter,452 U.S.

at 27-31 (referencing the Mathews framework).
126. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
127. Id.
128. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121 (1996). This is based on the fact that three out of
eight parental termination cases appealed in Mississippi between 1980 and 1996 were reversed
on appeal for failure to meet the "clear and convincing evidence" standard. Id. at 109 n.3 (citation
omitted).
129. 452 U.S. 18, 27-31.
130. Id.at 28. Lassiteralso discussed a parent's interest in the "accuracy and justice" of a
parental rights termination decision. Id. at 27.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss1/6
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presupposes that all issues within the scope of our adversary system are based
on binary, opposed interests. This assumption is also at the heart of the ML.B.
decision.
The notion of a risk of error is somewhat puzzling in the context of
termination of parental rights because the standards are vague,"' and therefore
the application of the standards to the facts is murky in many instances.'3 2 The
judicial determination is very different from that involving application of a
clear rule.' The termination of parental rights context is radically different
from the termination of social security benefits context, seen in Mathews v.
Eldridge."" In Santosky v. Kramer'3 5 the Court noted that the substantive
standards for terminating parental rights are imprecise and "leave
determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge."' 36 The
Court used this observation and other factors to justify a higher standard of
proof for termination of parental rights proceedings than had previously been
required.' 37 But if you are requiring clear and convincing evidence of
something that is vague, the result is not necessarily more accurate than
requiring a preponderance of the evidence of something that is vague.
Similarly, if you require a right to a transcript in order to appeal a determination
that is vague, you will not necessarily gain any more accuracy than if you do
not possess such a transcript. Thus, the notion of a risk of error is somewhat
problematic in this area.

131. See CLARK, supranote 89, § 21.6, at 625 (noting that definitions in termination of
parental rights statutes are tautological); id. § 21.7, at 632-33 (noting several reasons for the
vague standards: definitions ofgrounds for involuntary termination ofparental rights vary widely
between states, a variety of circumstances exist where termination is ordered, stare decisis has
limited applicability, and courts have widely divergent approaches to similar statutes).
132. The difficulty of determining whether trial courts have made proper decisions in the
termination of parental rights areas is illustrated by the Mississippi Court of Appeals ruling in
M.L.B. which was a divided vote of 7-3. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss.
App. LEXIS 299 (Miss. Ct. App. May 18, 1999). The Mississippi Supreme Court decision
affirming the Mississippi Court of Appeals decision was a divided vote of 6-2. M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
No. 97-CT-00929-SCT, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 93 (April 20, 2000). The various opinions differed
greatly concerning the significance of the facts found by the Chancellor and the interpretation of
the legal standard. Thus, one may say that the appeal process corrected the errors of the lower
court, but one may also argue that the errors of the lower court still are not so clear.
133. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARv.
L. REv. 1685, 1687, 1688-89 (1976) (noting that rules in contrast to standards offer certainty and
reduce arbitrary judicial action).
134. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the court noted the continued receipt of social
security benefits was "a statutorily created 'property' interestprotected by the Fifth Amendment."
Id.
at 332.
135. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
136. Id.at 762 (citing Smith v.Org. ofFoster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.26 (1977)). See
generally Appell, supra note 57, at 580 (determining "the state's reasons for both initial and
continuing intervention are ill-defined and maternally-focused").
137. Id. at 764.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 241

Second, the assumption found inLassiterandML.B. that an "equal contest
of opposed interests" is the best way to reach "accurate and just results" is
suspect in the area of family law and, increasingly, in law generally.'
Mediation, which is increasingly prevalent in family law, questions this
assumption at a fundamental level.'39 It is based on the idea that there are many
instances where the best way to reach positive outcomes is precisely not to view
conflicts as the equal contest of opposed interests, but to look for mutually
acceptable resolutions. 4 The trend toward mediation began with family law,
where mediation is most commonly required.' 4 '
In termination of parental rights cases, the equal contest of opposed
interests of state and parent may be the least likely route to a positive result for
children. The decisionmaking process, with its delays, intrusive processes, and
painful situations can traumatize children.'42 A less confrontational, less
absolute approach might work better in most circumstances for all involved.'43
be the worst
Similarly, an equal contest of opposed interests of parents may144
possible way of reaching positive results in child custody cases.
The idea that the risk of error concept fits uneasily with termination of
parental rights litigation also applies to child custody litigation. Yet, risk of

138. See generally I NANcY H. ROGERS & CRAIGA. MCEwEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY
& PRACTICE (2d. ed. 1994).
139. See generally id.
140. See generally id.
141. Id. § 7.02, at 4. Mediation is seen by some as a response to the indeterminacy of the
best interests of the child standard. See CLARK, supranote 89, § 15.2, at 163. Several states have
programs for mediating termination ofparental rights cases. See Sinden, supranote 57, at 355-58.
142. In addition to these concerns about the decisionmaking process, there are conceptual
problems with always viewing the issue as solely concerning the state versus parents' interests
without considering children's interests. See infra Part III.D.
143. However, concerns have also been raised that the mediation process reinforces power
dynamics that can be undercut somewhat by the formality of the litigation process. See, e.g.,
Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politicsof Power, 40 BuFF.
L. REv. 441,445 (1992) (noting that mediation empowers "the already more powerful husband"
in divorce proceeding to the disadvantage of wife); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
ProcessDangersforWomen, 100 YALEL.J. 1545,1549 (1991) (concluding mandatory mediation
does not provide a more humane or just alternative to the adversarial system); Scott H. Hughes,
Elizabeth'sStory: ExploringPowerlmbalancesin DivorceMediation, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
553, 579-80 (1995) (noting that while mediation can balance power among spouses, there are
inherent flaws); Sinden, supranote 57, at 389-91 (noting the effectiveness of informal procedures
may be lessened by the disparity of power). For a thoughtful analysis advocating formal
approaches and critiquing approaches such as mediation, see Sinden, supra note 57, at 355-58.
See also infra Part III.C.
144. The author's experience in supervising third year law students in a clinical program,
where students practice family law in Maine Courts for four years, is that the assumption that
contested custody litigation is terrible for parents and children appears to be universally shared
by lawyers, judges, and guardians ad litem.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss1/6
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error is not discussed in the context of child custody litigation.'45 The best
interest ofthe child standard is a very vague concept, which may be one reason
risk of error is not an explicit consideration. But, if the concept of risk of error
is meaningful in one area of children's legal relationships with their
parents-termination of parental rights--a better explanation is needed as to
why this concept is not meaningful in a related area--custody litigation.
Similarly, the idea that an equal contest of opposed interests may not actually
lead to positive results in parental rights termination cases also applies to child
custody disputes. But if an equal contest of opposed interests indeed is the best
way to make decisions about termination of parental rights, a more robust
explanation is needed as to why this model works for litigation of parental
rights termination but not for child custody litigation. Concomitantly, a stronger
explanation is needed to explain why the constitutional protections that apply
to litigation of termination of parental rights do not apply to parental disputes
about child custody.
Concerning parental rights termination litigation, important questions arise
concerning the appropriateness of the binary rights advocacy framework in all
instances.' 46 Risk of error may not be a sufficiently meaningful concept in this
context, and the binary advocacy framework may also be inadequate. Other
approaches such as mediation and changing the requirements for adoption, as
discussed below, should be considered.
C. The Lack of DistinctionBetween StepparentAdoptions and Other
Adoptions
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Thomas characterized ML.B. v. S.L.J simply
as a termination of parental rights case. Neither Justice seemed to view
stepparent adoption, which constitutes a large proportion of adoptions in the
United States,'47 as significant to the decision. Even though the state was not
taking the children away from a custodial parent and placing them with
strangers, "the challenged state action remains essentially the same: M.L.B.
resists the imposition of an official decree extinguishing, as no power other

145. See MAHONEY, supranote 12, at 124; see, e.g., Garskav. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,363
(W. Va. 1981) (introducing a more determinate "primary caretaker" standard in place of best
interests standard); cf CLARK, supra note 89, § 20.4, at 494-517. For example, in Troxel v.
Granville,Justice Kennedy's dissent noted that "[tihe best interests of the child standard has at
times been criticized as indeterminate, leading to unpredictable results." Troxel, 120 S. Ct. 2054,
2079 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTrITTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DissoLuIoN 2 & n.2 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1998). Yet, as discussed above, the
standards for terminating parental rights also are vague. See supratext accompanying notes 131,
135-36.
146. For additional discussion of the framework concerning the best interests of the child,
see infra Part III.D.
147. MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 161.
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than the State can, her parent-child relationships."'48 In a sense this concept is
true-the law of Mississippi and other states treats stepparent adoption the
same as other adoptions by requiring the termination of49parental rights of the
noneustodial parent before the adoption can take place.
However, different people affected by the controversy may have varying
perspectives as to whether the challenged state action is essentially the same in
this and other contexts. For example, M.L.B. may view the state action as
essentially the same whether the children are being placed with a stranger or
with her former husband of eight years and his new wife. Nonetheless, this does
not classify the state action as essentially the same from all perspectives. For
example, from the children's perspective, as articulated by the guardian ad
litem, the proposed state action apparently was not objectionable as the
guardian ad litem did not appeal the Chancellor's decision."' Moreover, the
state action in allowing stepparent adoptions is very different from a state
action where a parent's rights are terminated so that the child may be placed
with strangers. InML.B. the children were being placed with one person, their
father, with whom they had a fully formed parental relationship and with whom
they had been living their entire lives. They were also being placed with his
new wife, with whom they had been living for at least a year. The state did not
intrude on an intact family and seize the children or destroy bonds that were
unfrayed. The state of Mississippi in ML.B. chose one parent over the other,
which is not unlike the general outcomes of custody cases.
However, the situation ofM.L.B., S.L.J., and their children raises questions
about whether complete termination of parental rights should be required in
stepparent and other kinds of adoptions. The traditional adoption fiction of a
child being transferred to a new family, with all traces of the child's old family
being obliterated, does not fit this situation nor many other current situations. '
The children were six and eight years old when the petition to terminate was
filed.'52 The petition did not allege abuse, but claimed that M.L.B. had failed
to visit regularly and had failed to pay child support.' The children may have
formed important bonds with M.L.B. that would be against their best interests
to totally sever. It may also have been in the children's best interest for there to
be a legally recognized relationship between them and their stepmother,

148. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 n.8 (1996).
149. See discussion supra note 19.
150. See M.L.B. v. S.L.L, No. 95-853, 1996 WL 587663, at *23, 29 (1996).
151. See Appell, supranote 25, at 1008-13; MAHONEY, supranote 12, at 162-63; Mahoney,
supranote 19, at 101.
152. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
153. Id. M.L.B. testified that the reason she stopped paying child support was "because the
plaintiffwould not allow her visitation." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-009290-COA, 1999 Miss.
App. LEXIS 299, at *19.
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J.P.J."' Under these circumstances, it is not clear that the law should require

such an absolute termination in all adoptions.'
56
Various commentators and courts have advocated more flexible options.
The Uniform Adoption Act allows for the possibility ofpost-adoption visitation
rights for the former noncustodial parent after a stepparent adoption." 7 For
example, why not allow J.P.J. to adopt the children and still allow M.L.B. and
the children the opportunity to visit one another?' Why not have an adoption
certificate recognizing J.P.J. as a parent to the children, but not obliterate the
initial birth certificate? Why do we characterize parental rights in this binary
fashion when relationships are more complex than that? The open or
collaborative adoption movement has various proposals allowing for a more
nuanced approach.' 59
The state's requirement of absolute termination is part ofwhat leads to the
perceived need for constitutional protections. Since the deprivation is complete,
the process that is due is correspondingly greater. If the deprivation had not
been complete, lesser due process protections should be acceptable. Moreover,
this would probably facilitate the adoption process, in stepparent cases and
other cases, by making a consent to termination of one's parental rights less
absolute and less stigmatizing. Many situations exist where a parent is
genuinely overwhelmed and is willing to allow an ex-partner or foster parents
to adopt the child, but retaining some connection, such as annually receiving

154. Particularly as M.L.B. did not want custody but only wanted visitation, it might have
made sense to have a legally recognized relationship between the children and their stepmother
in the event of J.P.J.'s death. See Mahoney, supranote 19, at 108 (noting that prior to adoption,
legal relationship of stepparent and child is an "uncertain affair," but once adoption is final, rights
and duties of stepparent are the same as those of any other parent). See generally MAHONEY,
supra note 12, at 177-78 (describing the legal consequences of stepparent adoption).
155. It is similarly unclear why termination needs to be so stigmatizing. Justice Ginsburg
refers repeatedly to the "brand" associated with parental rights terminations. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at
125. She analogizes termination proceedings to criminal misdemeanor convictions. Id. at 120,
122-23, 125. Justice Ginsburg's tone may imply that they are worse than misdemeanor
convictions. Id. For a different perspective on this analogy, see Sinden, supra note 57, at 344-50.
156. See, e.g., Appell, supranote 25, at 1010-55 (discussing options for open or cooperative
adoptions); MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 161-89 (discussing stepparent adoptions).
157. See Mahoney, supranote 19, at 100.
158. According to the Chancellor, M.L.B.on cross-examination by the guardian ad litem
testified to the following:
She testified that she was not complaining about the children living with
their father, she knows that they are being well taken care of. She was
concerned about the telephone calls and having the right to converse with
her children. She said she had no doubt that J.P.J. [the stepmother] loves the
children and she loves them also. It used to bother her for the children to call
J.P.J. 'mother,' but she now understands. She is willing to pay child support,
provide medical insurance, but she wants visitation.
M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *20-21.
159. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 25, at 1010-49 (discussing the utility of open adoptions
and providing examples of cooperative adoption practices).
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pictures of the child, makes the parent's consent to absolute termination of her
parental rights psychologically possible."W The absoluteness of parental rights
and the rigidity of the adoption framework make this kind of resolution harder.
Legislative and judicial efforts to craft practical solutions for adoption
dilemmas should be applauded.
D. The ContinuedInvisibilityof Children
Children are invisible in both Justice Ginsburg's opinion and in the
dissenting opinions. Justice Ginsburg writes that the Court is "[g]uided by
Lassiterand Santosky, and other decisions acknowledging the primacy of the
parent-child relationship.'' The Court's references to the "parent-child
relationship" in those decisions indicate an acknowledgment of the two-way
nature of that relationship: the child's relationship with the parents and the
parents' relationship with the child. However, those decisions only concern the
latter half of that relationship: the parents' relationship with their child. The
National Center for Youth Law and other groups filed an amicus curiae brief
urging the Court to consider "not only the fundamental rights of parents, but the
fundamental rights of children to a parent-child relationship."'62 None of the
opinions by the United States Supreme Court or the Mississippi courts mention
this brief. None of the Justices acknowledge the invisibility of children' or
mention the possible effect of the decision itself on the children.'"

160. The drafters of the stepparent visitation provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act
assumed that this would be the case. Mahoney, supra note 19, at 104. This is confirmed
anecdotally through various conversations with attorneys and guardians ad litem. E.g.,
Conversation with Cushman Anthony, Esq. and Caroline Gardiner, Esq., in Portland, Me.
(December 7, 1999).
161. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (citations omitted).
162. BriefofAmici Curiae National Center for Youth Law et al. at *4, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519
U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853), available at 1996 WL 294200.
163. Interestingly, in Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens' dissent highlights the issue of
children's interests and states that "it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and
families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do
children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation [of
parent's interest versus state's interest]." Troxel, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2072 (2000). Neither the
concurrences nor the dissents explicitly discuss the liberty interests of children. See supra note
9.
164. The litigation probably was confusing for the children, who found that five and a half
years after M.L.B.'s parental rights had been terminated and they had been adopted by their
stepmother, M.L.B.'s parental rights actually had been improperly terminated and that they had
not been adopted after all. See supranotes 76-79. One concern is whether the resolution of these
kinds of cases should take as long as it does.
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As noted above, under Mississippi law, a guardian ad litem has to be
appointed when an adoption involves termination of parental rights.'65 The
guardian is not mentioned in the Court's opinion, but it was mentioned in the
oral argument that a guardian ad litem had been appointed who could have
appealed but did not." One ofthe Justices also suggested that the child's due
process interest was the same as the parent.167 In Justice Ginsburg's and Justice
Thomas' framework of parental rights versus the state, children are remarkably
absent. In that sense, the decision is in line with the decisions protecting
parents' rights to raise children, such as Meyer v. Nebraska68 and Pierce v.
Society ofSisters 69 which are thoughtfully characterized by one commentator
as cases about ownership of children. 7 °
The issue of how to identify the interests of children is challenging. In
termination proceedings, the issue is framed simply as the interests of the state
versus the interests of the parent or parents. Although Justice Ginsburg states
that the court must examine "closely and contextually" the governmental
interest advanced in support of the intrusion,' the interest advanced by the
state was purely financial.'72 Because the governmental interest was conceived
in such a constricted way, it is not surprising that even a contextual examination
resulted in the dismissal of the government's interest." However, in family

165. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-107(1) (Supp. 2000). See E.M.C. v. S.V.M., 695 So. 2d
576, 581 (Miss. 1997) (holding failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a child in a termination
of parental rights proceeding was reversible error).
166. See supranote 34.
167. A portion of the transcript indicates the Justice's suggestion that the due process
interests for parent and child are the same:
"Q: It is true, is it not, that the child has to be represented separately in the proceeding?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: And that's a matter of due process, too, I would suppose, because the child's rights are as
vitally affected as either set of parents."
See Transcript at *28, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853), availableat 1996 WL
587663. This statement is incorrect because the Court has recognized lesser constitutional rights
for children. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,130-32 (1989) (finding a child does
not have a constitutionally protected interest in maintaining a relationship with the biological
father where that interest conflicts with constitutionally protected interest of legal father). The
transcript does not identify which Justice asked the question. The author spoke with the attorneys
who were involved with the case and found the attorneys could not remember who asked the
question. Based on Justice Stevens' focus on the children's interest in his dissent, it seems that
the question may have been posed by Justice Stevens.
168. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
169. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
170. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and
the Childas Property,33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992).
171. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996).
172. Id. at 122.
173. The Court in Santosky v. Kramerhad already stated that a parent's interest was more
precious than money, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982). Thus, it is unsurprising in M.L.B. that the
parental interest outweighed the state's financial interest.
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law, the state is supposed to have a parens patriae interest in the well-being of
children. 74 Thus, in termination proceedings, the state interest should be seen
not simply as an external power opposing the parent but rather as an interest
aligned with the child's interests. However, this is difficult because in some
instances as the interest in the well-being of children is met by having the

children stay with their parents175 while in other instances it will be met by

removing them from their parents' custody. 76 Nonetheless, to conceive of the
state's interest in a particular termination procedure as merely financial seems
to define the state's interest in an overly constricted fashion.
Legal scholars have been developing theories regarding the associational
rights and interests of children. Gilbert Holmes has cogently argued that
"children's liberty interests in familial relationships" should receive
constitutional recognition. 77 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues that "our
attachment to [the] property-based notion of the private child cuts off a more
fruitful consideration of the rights of all children to safety, nurture, and
stability, to a voice, and to membership in the national family."' 78 Katherine
Federle proposes an empowerment model for children.' Bruce and Jonathan
Hafen argue that rights-based frameworks often are inappropriate for
children.' MarthaMinow acknowledges thatwhile the language ofrights does
not fit all children's situations, it can be used in some situations to "reach the
realities of children's lives."'"' When it does not fit children's lives, other
language must be used "to talk about children's needs and society's
responsibilities.""8 2 A comprehensive theory of children's rights or interests has
not been developed, and it may be that no single theory will be sufficient to

174. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. CL 2054,2072 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that the state's interest as parens patriae must be balanced against a parent's interest in a child).
The Court's powers to deal both with custody of children as between parents, and protection of
children from parents, derive from the parens patriae power. CLARK, supra note 89, § 20.1, at
476-77.
175. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67.
176. Id. at 767 & n.17. The Santosky majority claims that the parens patriae interest only
arises "at the disposition phase, after the parents have been found unfit." Id. The dissent
contemplates an earlier alignment between the child's interest and the state's interest and
considers the child's interest separate from the parent's interest. Id. at 788 n.13. The scope and
meaning of the parens patriae power is not clear from the Court's decisions and has not been
clarified by Troxel v. Granville.See supra notes 9, 163, 174.
177. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The ConstitutionalRight of Children to
MaintainRelationships with Parent-LikeIndividuals,53 MD. L. REv. 358, 385 (1994).
178. Woodhouse, supranote 170, at 1002, 1112-22.
179. Katherine Hunt Federle, LookingAhead: An Empowerment Perspectiveon the Rights
of Children, 68 TEMP. L. Rv. 1585, 1585-86 (1995).
180. Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning Childrento TheirAutonomy: The
UnitedNationsConvention on the Rights ofthe Child,37 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 449,450-51 (1996).
18 1. Martha Minow, Children'sRights: Where We've Been, and Where We're Going,68
TEMP. L. REv. 1573, 1583 (1995).
182. Id.
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deal with all issues of parents, children, and the state.' However, we need to
continue to think of ways to include children in the legal frameworks that apply
to their lives.
IV. CONCLUSION
ML.B. v. S.L.J. presents opportunities to analyze the parental rights
framework and the family law issues to which it relates in new ways.
Termination of parental rights decisions are not as distinct from child custody
decisions for indigent parents as the law assumes. The adversary framework,
with its assumption of risk of error, may not be the most suitable framework for
termination of parental rights in all instances, despite its application in ML.B.
and other termination of parental rights cases. Modifying traditional adoption
doctrines to recognize different approaches that might work in stepparent and
other adoption contexts is one way to move away from the simplistic
framework we currently use. Last, we need to continue to explore ways to
expand our consideration of the children's interests.

183. For example, Emily Buss recently developed a theory for dealing with the free exercise
rights of children, based on an analogy between exercise ofreligious freedom and abortion rights.
Emily Buss, Khat Does FriedaYoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 53, 74-76 (1999). This
framework may be appropriate for children's free exercise rights, but not for custody
determinations. Id. at 76. See generally Sean Ireland, Children as Legal Persons: Defining
Standards ThroughJudicialDiscretion(unpublished paper on file with the author).
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